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INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to say knowledge is power?
Francis Bacon is alleged to have said it first.1 In that version, the
remark is supposed to have captured the signature aspiration of mo-
dernity - to deploy knowledge for the sake of the mastery on which
human progress depends. The inquiry of experts would unlock the ar-
cana of nature, and provide a mode of beneficial rule that could escape
old criticisms of the power of ill-informed and thus to some extent ille-
gitimate monarchs. "[T]he sovereignty of man lieth hid in knowledge,"
Bacon wrote,
wherein many things are reserved, which kings with their treasure cannot
buy, nor with their force command; their spials and intelligencers can give
no news of them, their seamen and discoverers cannot sail where they
grow: now we govern nature in opinions, but we are thrall unto her in ne-
cessity ... [but] we should command her by action.2
Expertise, that is, would offer liberation from the age-old yoke of na-
ture by taking humanity beyond the realm of mere opinion. Kings had
proved themselves powerless to lift this yoke, but experts would do so
for the sake of man's advancement and "sovereignty." It was an opti-
mistic, untroubled, and even visionary statement.
In the several centuries since, expert governance - rule by elite
knowledge claimed to be superior to mere opinion - has fallen under
suspicion. But there is a serious debate about how to diagnose its pos-
sible failings. Bacon's own younger colleague, and sometime amanu-
ensis, Thomas Hobbes, could not believe his predecessor's rather op-
timistic views of the politics of knowledge. According to Hobbes's
radically nominalist account, there was not a world to know nor mas-
ter independent of human struggle to decide how to think and even
* Professor of Law and History, Harvard University.
1 As Professor Brian Vickers writes, "the ascription to Bacon's philosophical works of the
generalized statement that 'knowledge is power' is erroneous." Brian Vickers, Francis Bacon and
the Progress of Knowledge, 53 J. HIST. IDEAS 495, 512 n.47 (1992).




talk about that world. "[S]uch is the nature of men," Hobbes wrote,
"that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty,
or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there
be many so wise as themselves . . . . "3 Kings were needed not because
people could agree who knew most, but for precisely the opposite rea-
son. Before human beings could decide what the world was like, they
would have to find a way to settle their differences. Knowledge was
not an alternative to the uninformed power of kings; rather, bitter par-
tisanship about how to know the world provided one more reason for
their pacifying authority. But after Hobbes, exactly what drove epi-
stemic struggle - and how it was best to be explained - have re-
mained themselves persistently controversial.
For Karl Marx and his heirs, expert rule would have to be regarded
as a species of ideology originating in and covering up the class domi-
nation that, in turn, followed from the mode of production of an age.
The forms and workings of intelligence, for this reason, had to be
traced to ultimately material factors. For twentieth-century skeptics,
things seemed more complicated. While never freeing expertise from
the workings of capital entirely, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in-
sisted that professional fields had their own internal dynamics of
struggle for prestige and status. Yet like Marx, Bourdieu hoped to
demystify these workings, for the sake of better insight and political
change.4  Michel Foucault, in his withering portrait of "pow-
er/knowledge," took cynicism to the breaking point.5 Knowledge did
not merely serve power; it was power. It constituted domination in
claiming to neutrally describe reality. And there was no apparent, let
alone easy, alternative to subordination. Foucault went as far as pos-
sible to reverse the Baconian vision of liberation and legitimation
through knowledge - studying experts was for Foucault the great de-
vice of delegitimation, with unclear consequences.
In his new book on how the world is ruled today through expert
knowledge, Professor David Kennedy enters this continuing discussion
in brilliant, pathbreaking, and trademark fashion. Slyly presenting
himself as a disinterested observer of global governance, Kennedy
eclectically draws on twentieth-century perspectives about knowledge,
achieving a synthesis all his own. Presented without theoretical en-
cumbrance or jargon, A World of Struggle is a straightforward but so-
phisticated account that capitalizes on prior insight to achieve a
3 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 87 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
(165)-
4 See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGE-
MENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1984) (1979).
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS, 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 198o).
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unique and powerful vantage point. The superlative book wins its dis-
tinction not only because it constructs a novel theory but also because
it applies that theory to how the globe as a whole is ruled - some-
thing no one in the canon of social theory has really done.
According to Kennedy, accounts of global governance are them-
selves typically products of an expertise that does much of the work of
immunizing a contestable world from serious critique or change. "Ter-
ribly unjust, subject to crisis, environmentally unwise, everywhere po-
litically and economically captured by the few, and yet somehow im-
possible for anyone to alter or escape" is Kennedy's description of the
contemporary situation (pp. 31-32). His "hypothesis" in response is
that "this stability arises from the relative invisibility and impervious-
ness of the world of technical management to contestation" (p. 32). To
understand expertise is to grasp how the terms of debate and decision
about solutions end up reinstating problems.
Much in the book is vintage Kennedy. There is a sinuous prose
cast with enviable lucidity in spite of its high level of complexity.
There is, as I will examine later, the structuralist vocation that, from
Kennedy's beginnings, has delighted in providing inventories of op-
tions of discourse (and charts graphically illustrating the argumenta-
tive choices). Indeed, one of the hallmarks of A World of Struggle is
how heavily it focuses on the language that constitutes, in Kennedy's
account, the familiar realities of global governance, from the interstate
system to the global economy. There is also, as I will take up later, the
extravagant political hope that Kennedy never imposes on his readers
but allows to lurk on the margin as an attractive but vague possibility.
Altogether, Kennedy's new book reminds his old readers and in-
structs his new ones why he is, without doubt, the single most im-
portant innovator in international legal thought of the past several
decades, a fact proved not only by his own arguments but also by his
extraordinary influence. Inaugurating a "new stream" of scholarship
on international law, Kennedy has brought the field out of its
doctrinalism and parochialism into conversation with social thought
and humanistic inquiry.6 With few possible contenders, like his close
associate Professor Martti Koskenniemi, Kennedy may have done the
most to make the "invisible college"' of international lawyers visible,
or at least interesting, to those outside it in diverse fields of academic
6 See David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. i
(1988); see also NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jos6 Maria Beneyto & David
Kennedy eds., 2012); Ntina Tzouvala, New Approaches to International Law: The History of a
Project, 27 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 215 (2016) (reviewing NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra).
Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 217
(1977).
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pursuit. And this book takes that remarkable achievement to a new
level. As a result, this is the rare text occupied with international law
that is likely to be legible by - indeed, exhilarating to - outsiders to
the field, elsewhere in the legal academy and beyond.
This Review focuses on what is newest in the book: Kennedy's de-
velopment of a theory of expertise to map the terrain of contemporary
global governance. The Review proceeds in six parts. Part I begins
my reconstruction of Kennedy's theory of expertise by emphasizing the
centrality of struggle to his account. Part II then provides an overview
of the core of A World of Struggle, rehearsing Kennedy's argument that
endemic struggle explains the role of expertise in global governance.
Part III completes my survey of the work by showing how Kennedy
applies his general theory of expertise to international law.
From reconstruction, the Review then turns to contextualization
and critique. Part IV puts pressure on Kennedy's theory by placing it
in the setting of argument from Bacon to Foucault concerning the rela-
tion of knowledge and power. A theory of global power that is discur-
sive in general and structuralist in particular will have the vices of its
virtues. Experts do no more than talk, and it is tempting to believe an
analysis of their discourse goes further in explaining their role than it
does. In particular, it may scant causation outside the frame of lan-
guage and focus on the processes of rule at the expense of outcomes.
Part V takes up Kennedy's case study on the law of war as an instan-
tiation of how his theory of expert knowledge works. Part VI con-
cludes by examining whether Kennedy is subject to his own analysis
and how he hints at the promise of a form of responsible power be-
yond expertise. Most worrisome about the book is that Kennedy is
driven to a skepticism of expertise so withering that the sole alterna-
tive he can recommend - a potentially empty one - is what he calls
"unknowing."
I. OUR STRUGGLES
In the beginning, Kennedy says, was struggle (pp. 54-86). We
know of such a story in politics: states coexist and compete in the
nervous condition of "anarchical society" that sometimes devolves into
war.8 And it is familiar to envisage the economy as a realm of the col-
lision of interests (which in more affirmative accounts can sometimes
harmonize). But the novelty in Kennedy's approach is that expertise
does not accrue within an overall system that is political or economic
by definition: the international state system or the global economic or-
der as the most fundamental realities. Rather, knowledge - the




struggle to claim expertise - produces such domains about which ex-
perts say they know something. Experts, Kennedy writes,
generate identities for themselves and allocate powers and resources in
ways that might be interpreted, with the benefit of distance or hindsight,
as constituting a system . . . . [A]ctivity that might otherwise seem a tech-
nical practice within a system can be understood as generative of the 'ac-
tors' and 'structures' that populate the systems . . . ." (pp. 55-56)
Not politics first, or economics first, but epistemic struggle first.
Now on what grounds can Kennedy defend such an account? Af-
ter all, Hobbes's picture, famously starting from struggle, was itself
fundamentally epistemic first. But Kennedy's state of nature is even
more barebones, especially since he wants to emphasize that there is
ultimately no exit from the terrain of struggle. He starts from "people
pursuing projects" as the most neutral description he can find (p. 56).
"States" or "individuals" in a relationship of rule and rights, or "capi-
tal" and "labor" making serial bargains over distribution, are terms al-
ready committed to some epistemically fraught picture of the world.
In contrast, the notion of "people pursuing projects" is not. Of course,
to understand global governance as driven by struggle is not to posit a
"level playing field" among such people, since it is an "iterative affair"
that has already been through endless rounds (p. 56). And then the
next round starts, with endless cycles of winners and losers locking in
advantage but never foreclosing renewed engagement.
What seems distinctive about Kennedy's view - after all, he cites
illustrious predecessors for it, from Hobbes himself to Adam Smith,
Carl von Clausewitz, and Carl Schmitt9 - is that he places a large
emphasis on how intellectual expertise figures in the game (pp. 56-58).
That is why he requires so neutral a description of struggle: "To speak
about the system and its logic can only be a strategy: to orient or justi-
fy oneself or talk one's opponent into a corner of necessity" (p. 58).
Even to say politics is a struggle that leads to a state (Hobbes) or that
economics involves the play of self-interest (Smith) is to try to set ex-
pertise up as a special arbiter or umpire whose representatives have
privileged insight into the proceedings. But this is just a move in the
game, not an analysis of it. In a sense, then, Kennedy is claiming that
only the most austere social theory positing epistemic struggle first can
claim to be neutral description. Otherwise, his book itself would be an
act of expertise enacting a strategy, rather than a detached look at it.
9 Kennedy refers to THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1958) (1651); ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(London 1812) (1776); CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. &
trans., 1976) (1832); and CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab
trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1932).
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(I will come back to this problem of self-reference later: in what sense
is Kennedy's own approach not an analysis of a system and its logic?)
Expertise also defines what is to be gained by fighting. The spoils
are determined not by objective facts about the world - for example,
that labor accounts for value in the economy - but are themselves a
topic of contention that expertise helps define. Kennedy remarks that
the point of his approach is to provide immunity from three mistakes:
"the tendency to reify the actors and structures one sees, a bias toward
order, and the potential to overlook the knowledge work of experts
with the result that their shared logic is treated as the logic of the sys-
tem itself" (p. 75). And what the continuing struggle is itself about is
similarly swept into the analytic framework. Kennedy says the goal of
his austerity is to force us to ask how different framings of global ac-
tivity would have different winners and losers: "Placing struggle rather
than system at the center of the story encourages opposing interests to
be identified and the costs and benefits of alternative projects to be as-
sessed" (p. 59). Yet what you get from winning and losing - and even
what counts as interests - are not set in advance, but are themselves
subject to intense struggle.
That struggle only very rarely involves outright force (though the
threat of its use is rarely entirely absent), as the centrality of expertise
in Kennedy's account already suggests. Or in another formulation, the
tradition in which Kennedy places himself redefines war to be not
simply traditional military activity, but what all the multifarious forms
of human life are ultimately about. Where von Clausewitz argued that
war is politics by other means, and Foucault added that the reverse is
also true,10 Kennedy claims that expertise is also a form of politics and
therefore a form of war. And the most exciting plays in this game are
those that transform the game itself: "The most savvy players are al-
ways on the lookout for moves, risks, and opportunities outside the
frame" (p. 64).
A profoundly strategic view of human action of this kind may seem
unlovely, and has elicited howls of protest over the centuries for mis-
understanding the potential of collaboration and compassion. But its
power has always been that cynicism helps immunize against overly
romantic accounts of why some people have always ruled over others,
and continue to do so. Law figures not as a necessarily pacifying
agent - as international lawyers over the generations have sometimes
optimistically hoped - but as a manual for impending combat: "[law
provides a kind of guidebook to the global terrain of struggle" (p. 61).
10 See VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 9, at 87; MICHEL FOUCAULT, "SOCIETY MUST BE




However, law is not simply a kind of antecedent record of how the
fighting has gone previously for the prospective participant to survey
the lay of the land and to learn how the rules of the game are currently
written. Lawyering does serve that purpose, but it also enters into the
terrain of struggle itself as competition unfolds. Kennedy explicitly us-
es the newfangled term "lawfare" to make sense of this aspect of his
argument, and how specifically legal expertise figures in the epistemic
war of all against all (p. 62)." If expertise is war, then practicing law
is also war.
No account of distributive outcomes in today's world - who wins
and loses - can afford to skirt expertise in general and legal expertise
in particular. Kennedy cautions that his own account of expertise is
not committed to the view that all players are warriors seeking domi-
nance (though most are). Some in struggle want to be generals, but
most willingly serve as soldiers. A few even are content with the role
of perpetual losers: "[s]ome people - even entire professions - seek
marginality, even misery," Kennedy says (p. 68). From benevolent
Christians to human rights activists, groups have long known that the
struggle to dominate is so deeply the way of the world that they would
rather embrace the role of victims or minister to the defeated, choosing
morality over victory. Even if they rarely change or even hope to
change the outcome of cyclical engagement, such figures can at least
claim not to have caused it. But ingeniously, Kennedy supposes that
"losers" hardly portend some full-scale alternative to a world of strug-
gle (as Jesus Christ and his followers have often prayed). For today's
losers by choice develop their own forms of expertise, Kennedy says, to
justify and advance their roles in the world. 1 2 Perhaps the righteous
will reap rewards in the next life, or the meek will inherit the earth
someday. But the real point is strategizing in this world. No one, it
seems, is above the will to power.
II. A THEORY OF EXPERTISE
It is within the general landscape of struggle with its multifarious
forms, Kennedy thinks, that the specific device he calls expertise plays
an unrecognized role. The bulk of A World of Struggle constructs a
theory that brings the otherwise hidden role of expertise to light.
11 For the coinage of "lawfare," see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Commentary, Lawfare Today: A
Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 146 (2008).
12 Kennedy does not appear to go so far as Friedrich Nietzsche in presenting losing as itself a
covert attempt driven by resentment to establish domination out of a situation of weakness. See
generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY (Maudemarie Clark
& Alan J. Swensen trans., Hackett Publ'g Co., 1998) (1887).
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For a book intended to surpass prior accounts of "global gover-
nance," Kennedy usefully begins the core of his book by disengaging
how ubiquitous struggle sometimes constructs problems as global in
the first place (while others remain local or national) (pp. 23-53). No
problem is global until it is defined as such, with a certain priority -
which simultaneously means that other problems are either not prob-
lems or not viewed as having a worldwide scale or solution. Insiders
decide what those problems are, while outsiders generally see their
priorities lose out. Thus, before the game even begins to make global
governance work, Kennedy observes, a prior game has been played
over its parameters, with winners and losers.
This fact is a legacy, Kennedy says, of a centuries-long series of
calls for and legitimations of global governance - with problems iden-
tified at a worldwide scale requiring outcomes at that level (pp.
89-107). He offers an illuminating parallel of early modern Spanish
theologian Francisco de Vitoria and the Apollo 17 "blue marble" pho-
tograph of the earth from space (pp. 911-93). Both legitimized world-
making for elites, giving them the sense that there was one human
community, with the specific demands of that realization now open to
definition and contestation. Vitoria thought that the discovery of the
new world meant that there was a universal obligation to hear the true
gospel of his time, which meant that of the Christian religion; for
Kennedy, not much has changed in the aftermath of the most recent
spates of "world-making stories," which create the impression that
global unity is a problem for those in power to impose politically and
technocratically. "The world pictures of insiders are rarely fully settled
into common sense: they still need the space photo as the Spanish
needed Vitoria," Kennedy explains (p. 93). "Nor are outsiders unable
to assimilate or argue forcefully in the insider language of problem
solving. The opposition nevertheless marks the boundaries and pro-
vides the terms within which debate and conflict over more specific
world-making projects occurs as experts arrange and rearrange images
drawn from this stock" (p. 93).
At the core of Kennedy's theory of expertise is a pivotal distinction
between "foreground" and "background" (pp. 108-34). What takes
place in the foreground - even grand decisionmaking where real
choices appear to be momentous and deep (Kennedy's repeated para-
digm case is the Cuban missile crisis) - presupposes prior scene set-
ting, as his originally dramaturgical terms suggest (pp. 112-13). Previ-
ous foreground decisions have excluded certain options, while making
others appear unreasonable. But above all, the background work of
experts functions not only to naturalize those prior decisions but also
to set up the coming foreground decision, by providing a sense of the
situation and enumerating the choices. Experts rule by shaping the
decisions of those who believe they decide everything. Existing theo-
ries of global governance, Kennedy is contending, disregard or down-
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play how central the expert scene setting has been both to why the
choice in the foreground seems plausible and why it takes the form it
does. "When background work has been most successful," he remarks,
"it is very difficult to see" (p. 116). But if we are distracted by the
foreground, then we will easily miss how much it requires a back-
ground, where experts have been struggling to frame and influence the
front of the stage.
Kennedy goes on to say that experts rule by "articulation" - sim-
ply claiming to describe neutrally and counsel uncontroversially (pp.
135-67). Law does not coerce, at least on its own; it only does so when
lawyers say the state or other actors need to interpret and apply it in
certain ways and find their advice operationalized. As Kennedy im-
mediately clarifies, those occasions when experts engage with one an-
other, or see the need to argue at all, are the exceptional cases, not the
routine ones, because argument risks revealing how contestable au-
thority is (p. 136). Someone forced into giving an argument might be
wrong. Most of the time, therefore, expertise works by assertion.
"Expert articulation is straightforwardly performative: this is how
things are. In this sense, expert argument is the tip of a large iceberg
of expert effect" (p. 136). Articulation by experts is their general mode
of rule, which the infrequency of argument proves. And there is no
one, Kennedy insists, outside the ultimately discursive realm of articu-
lation, for everyone must assert or argue on the road from norm to ap-
plication. "When the prince decides," Kennedy remarks, "his decision
is also an argument and assertion, to himself and others: an argument
for his own authority, for its meaning, and for the consequences that
ought to flow from it" (p. 135).
To anticipate my later critical engagement with the book, it will
help to dwell on the relationship between the discursive matters that
Kennedy puts at the focus and the real world that expertise is in some
sense about. From the first page, Kennedy refers to "wealth, status,
and opportunity" as the stakes of the game (p. i), and it would be im-
plausible not to notice Kennedy's interest in the distribution of the hi-
erarchy of opportunity in the world and the radically distinctive mate-
rial circumstances different people enjoy (or suffer). But it is equally
implausible to pretend he thinks the definition of these achievements
for winners and losers somehow lies outside the forum of their contest
as stable metrics of victory and defeat. And the analytical weight of
the book, not least in the core theory of expertise, falls so heavily on
the discursive that it makes Kennedy sound like a full-blown social
constructionist - or if not, someone whose default when in doubt is to
dwell within the discursive setting of expert struggle, rather than seek
its relationship with its own larger setting.
The discursive clearly has considerable autonomy, because experts
have the trump card of articulation when it comes to the
nondiscursive. And critically, Kennedy contends, there is no general
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scheme for explaining how exactly it is that what once had to be ar-
gued can now simply be asserted. Similarly, there is no general theory
offered to account for the transformation of assertion into common
sense. "The process by which an assertion that began as an argument
passes over to performative articulation is difficult to unravel,"
Kennedy surmises (p. 136). He writes further:
It is easy to underestimate the role of coercion or social hegemony, to over-
estimate the role of persuasion, or to imagine persuasion as a matter of
good arguments driving out bad. In every field, relations with the materi-
al world of force and the social world of prestige and legitimacy will be
different. (p. 136)
But if this is the case, then expertise still must work in relation to oth-
er forces, like the coercive structure of a professional discipline, gov-
ernmental hierarchy, or a broader set of social norms established by
other forces than discourse, that together explain why some opinions
win out among experts while others do not. That is, expertise itself
has its own larger ecology, and ultimately it is critical to engage the re-
lationship between the intra- and extra-discursive. One thing is clear:
Kennedy is very far away from an approach to discourse in which cor-
respondence with the world, a tribunal of experience, or the inbuilt
norms of communicative rationality (which allow the best arguments
to win without force) could serve.1 3
Whatever the difficulties of Kennedy's account of the relation of
language and reality, he powerfully applies his broader theory of ex-
pertise to real cases. Throughout the book, but notably in his theory
of articulation, Kennedy refers to expert domains such as economic
development and human rights law. He proves that experts in such
domains are well described by the theory of expertise he is generating,
while also illustrating that differences among fields generate a diverse
range of forms for that expertise to take. For example, economic de-
velopment is relatively interdisciplinary and fact sensitive. Much
turns on specific features of the terrain to be developed, including the
willingness of local states to participate. By contrast, human rights
law tends to be more context independent (at least when it comes to
political and civil rights): the rules apply no matter what else is true of
a regime's political and social situation. In his theory of articulation,
Kennedy notes that economic development specialists are much more
familiar with argument than assertion, perhaps because so many of
their expert schemes have proven faulty, if not disastrous, in the past
(p. 151). By contrast, human rights experts with their stripped down
13 For possibilities that contrast with Kennedy's, see JURGEN HABERMAS,
Wahrheitstheorien, in VORSTUDIEN UND ERGANZUNGEN ZUR THEORIE DES
KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS 127 (1984). Habermas explicates his scheme of "communica-
tive rationality" in other texts of the same volume.
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list of norms experience less argument (few will push back in response
by asserting the validity of torture, even if the states they represent en-
gage in the practice). In revenge, however, human rights lawyers suf-
fer the repeated experience of "articulat[ing] what needs no articula-
tion" but not being heeded (p. 145).
In a particularly interesting discussion, Kennedy notes that expert
articulation thrives on ambiguity and what he calls "disenchantment"
(p. i51). In many domains of expert knowledge, the iterative struggle
of the past has produced a series of bad options that define the bound-
aries of future engagement. Much as no economist today, when it
comes to the role of the state, would advocate either the absolute non-
interventionism of the nineteenth century or the command-and-
planning ideologies of the twentieth, so in all fields experts generate
viable choices along a continuum that extends from one impermissible
extreme to another. But if this is true, the continuum of permissible
options in between is always going to be a matter of more or less, rath-
er than either/or: how much state intervention in economic affairs is
allowed, for example, once total absence or control are ruled out. And
so expert recommendations will always be possible to outflank in ei-
ther direction on the continuum.
In consequence, expertise works in part by destabilizing confidence
in its own contribution. "One would expect a field to fall out of use as
it loses decisive clarity: if you can't tell us what is and is not legal or
how to bring about development, then we don't need your expertise,"
Kennedy observes (p. 153). "Instead, the more complex and indecisive
the expertise, the more useful it has become" (p. 153). He explains:
"There is something useful about a vocabulary of debate that is able to
draw fine distinctions on the basis of an undecidable difference be-
tween indefensible extremes" (p. 152). Experts rule in part by multi-
plying options and asserting (or if necessary arguing) that we live in a
world that needs their ability to choose the right point on the line after
simple options have lost credibility.
As Kennedy goes on to detail, the experts working on the line de-
velop a specific personal style: they rule nonexperts out, while their
"sophistication" combines a certain disenchantment about the avail-
ability of self-evident answers with a commitment to the proposition
that only experts can dictate responses (p. 155). Indeed, Kennedy re-
cords, they "can experience themselves as more 'professional' even as
their confidence in the content of their expertise declines" (p. 155). In
part for this very reason, experts thrive on not deciding and remaining
in the space of uncertainty before someone else has made a decision.
Given their druthers, experts would continue deliberating. "Experts
often flee from this experience," Kennedy writes of the moment of de-
cision that officially justifies their existence but which they avoid at all
costs (p. 66). "Their flight, their denial of freedom and responsibility
is part of their self-presentation as an expert" (p. 66).
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III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EXPERTISE
Intended as a general account of expertise, Kennedy's scheme takes
on extra importance when deployed to make sense of how internation-
al legal authority works in today's world. As in any domain, expertise
in international law is specific, but - Kennedy suggests with some in-
decision of his own - in ways that "may be exemplary for other glob-
alizing modes of expertise" (p. 5). While some might want to cordon
off specifically legal knowledge, Kennedy's impulse is the reverse. In-
deed one good way to read his book is to understand it as an account
of what an international lawyer notices about governance and can
teach his differently situated colleagues in diplomacy or economics.
Law therefore pervades the book as a model on the premise that legal
expertise helps reveal the nature of other kinds of expertise. Corre-
spondingly, Kennedy courts the risk of emphasizing far more continui-
ties between expertise generally and legal expertise in particular, focus-
ing only rarely on whatever might make the process of presenting
claims and establishing authority in international law distinctive. 14
But the emphasis on law in global governance also has a historical
justification. The sheer relevance of international law for decision-
makers has surged in recent decades, which - predictably, but power-
fully - Kennedy views as an event following on prior struggles that
has in turn hewed out new terrain for future conflicts. In both devel-
opments, expertise has been central. Articulating law before a recep-
tive audience transforms political debate into a legal question, narrow-
ing the source of legitimacy that one can bring to bear on it, and
entitling one set of experts to a preeminent role.
As a result, an account of the expertise of international lawyers will
have to be central to any theory of "global governance." Even if tradi-
tional skepticism of international law remains, it is startling how legal-
ized contemporary global relations now are, with obvious consequenc-
es both for outcomes and for who determines them. "Although it is
easy to think of international affairs as a rolling sea of politics over
which we have managed to throw but a thin net of legal rules,"
Kennedy writes, "in truth the situation today is more the reverse.
There is law at every turn. Even war today is an affair of rules and
regulations and legal principles" (p. 174). In an apparent paradox,
Kennedy adds, "[t]he dispersion and fragmentation of economic and
14 Kennedy worked through disciplinary specificity for much of his career and notably at its
beginning, while Koskenniemi's similarly classic inventory of argument in international law
makes the task of connecting law to governance more generally the priority now. See generally
DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI




political power brought about by their globalization have only acceler-
ated their legalization" (p. 174).
Although Kennedy is clear about the meteoric rise in the salience of
legal rules within international affairs in the last century, he scants any
account of how and why it occurred. He opts instead for an internalist
portrait of how international lawyers have interpreted their own plight
and kept the reality of the power they exercise as experts at arm's
length, and references only the increase in their sophistication as the
reason for their growing relevance (p. 172). The result of this increase
in sophistication has been that these experts mask - even for them-
selves - how decisive a factor their own expertise has been in out-
comes they might personally abhor.
In this vein, Kennedy paints what he rightly intends to be a devas-
tating portrait of international legal expertise (pp. 218-55). It is all the
more cutting for being completely free of abuse or contempt: after all,
Kennedy is describing his own community. Disenchanted profession-
als, international lawyers hew nonetheless to "a faith that precludes
some kinds of self-reflection. Law's role in distribution, inequality,
and conflict are leeched out: they belong to politics or to economic
competition. Law is a nobler thing" (p. 219). Indeed, according to
Kennedy, the very faith that suspends insight into their participation in
rule is one reason why international lawyers may secretly cherish the
eternal debate about whether international law is law: the more the re-
ality of international law is an open question, the harder it is to admit
the role of international lawyers in outcomes.
Even when international lawyers insist doggedly on the reality of
international law, Kennedy says, they are loath to view their own ex-
pertise as a form of authority that inevitably privileges and distributes.
"Rather than seeing the hand of power in the glove of law, mainstream
international lawyers focus on the glove," Kennedy writes:
They see law acting everywhere in the world and celebrate the ability of
civil society organizations, individuals, or national judges to participate in
global rule making. Where the outcomes are not desirable or when bad
things happen in the name of law, they prefer to see the misrule of power
dressing itself in legal justification. (p. 240)
Kennedy explains the fact that this goes on with a remarkable venture
into the sociology of religion. He argues that there is a professional
community fideistically committed to the proposition that international
law is ultimately a good thing. This dictates necessary belief in the vi-
ability of the professional role, while also subjecting the religious
community to the threat that belief may fail (p. 242). Kennedy takes
the metaphor of faith - if it is a metaphor - very far, proceeding to
interpret international legal theory as "a ministry to a doubting
church" whose members need reassurance in the face of the unending
threat of disbelief (p. 252).
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That international lawyers have not theorized their own expertise
does not mean they fail to conform to Kennedy's theory of it. In an-
other chapter, Kennedy explores the specificity of international law as
a lexicon of expertise (pp. 171-217). At the focus, in the spirit of legal
institutionalists and realists such as Robert Hale and Wesley Hohfeld
and the intensification of their thought in the critical legal studies
movement, is an explanation of exactly how legal expertise can have
distributive consequences.
When one side in discursive struggle prevails, there are winners
and losers distributionally, too. Expounding David Ricardo's theory of
trade and rents, Kennedy attributes the enormous importance of legal
entitlements to the role they play in determining who wins and loses
(and by how much) (pp. 177-82). "The bargaining power of everyone
involved" in a given trade relationship "depends on their ability to ex-
clude others and coerce others to surrender gains," Kennedy writes (p.
184). "All countries now understand that you have to strategize your
insertion into the global economy by arranging the institutions over
which you have some control to enable economic actors you prefer to
get and keep the gains" (p. 188). Law - or more exactly legal exper-
tise - matters because it convinces people to allow one set of actors to
keep gains by excluding another set from taking rents. In the after-
math of struggle, law registers who won, as kept gains are consolidat-
ed. Legalization is a fundamental move in the game itself, as well as a
kind of consensual means of keeping score. The dynamics that prevail
at the more microscopic level also prevail at the macroscopic scale of
the world, as global rules ratify and entrench the results of prior strug-
gle while providing the terms for new ones. The frequent though not
inevitable result is that the rich get richer. The larger lesson is that ac-
tors not only aim for discrete outcomes in games, but also "play for
rules" that will repeatedly determine outcomes in future ones - and
those rules call on legal expertise to be the essential weapon (p. 199).
Kennedy's picture would be hilarious if it were not depressing.
Somewhat like the protagonist of Molibre's comedy, who does not real-
ize he speaks prose, international lawyers play the same discursive and
distributional role that all experts do, sans le savoir.15 As a rule, how-
ever, expertise even among reformers serves to ratify the continuing
and cumulative victories of the powerful, rather than serving the
weak. What would happen, Kennedy asks, if international lawyers
who frequently think they are making the world a better place spent
more of their time puzzling through why this is?
15 MOLIfRE, LE BOURGEOIs GENTILHOMME (1670).
20I6] 21I77
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR EXPERTISE
All told, Kennedy has assembled a complex and fascinating scheme
to account for the power of experts in today's world. Compared with
the analysts of world affairs or international law who leave that factor
out of account, he is very good about expounding why it is important
to study expertise. But Kennedy is not as good at recounting other
ways to foreground expertise, or how his views about it differ from
those who also give it pride of place.
In a helpful section, Kennedy specifies exactly what approaches to
international affairs or law miss in avoiding inquiry into how expertise
constitutes intellectual fields like "political science" or "economics" -
as if their objects of study were real things independent of expert ob-
servation and theorization. These approaches, whatever their value,
often commit three cardinal sins: reifying their objects of study, overes-
timating order, and mistaking an expert claim that the object has a
logic - for example, that capitalism is self-regulating - for a truth
about the world (pp. 75-86).
In his portrait of the constructive and aggressive role of experts in
continuing the fight to rule the world in the name of analyzing it,
Kennedy certainly affiliates not with Bacon but with Hobbes - in
spite of some hints of his own utopianism (to which I will return in the
last section). Knowledge is not an alternative to the struggle of inter-
personal life, but part of its very essence, and a means through which
some achieve domination over others, and lock in that domination
indefinitely.
Meanwhile, Kennedy mentions a series of twentieth- and twenty-
first-century authorities in the critical tradition, but normally in end-
notes, in an offhand way, without detailed affiliation (or rejection). In
a revealing endnote, for example, he remarks that Foucault has placed
a premium on "revealing rather than obscuring the role of war in the
routines of peace" (p. 284).16 This is probably the best description of
what Kennedy himself is trying to achieve in this book with respect to
expertise in international affairs in general and in international law in
particular. But his reference is charmingly vague, saving Kennedy's
exposition from scholastic infighting while making it hard to identify
what is supposed to be unique about his venture.
Kennedy does say that he has been especially inspired by "science
studies" (itself often Foucauldian in inspiration) for disengaging the
"performative dimension of expert practice: expert work constituting
16 Kennedy cites Michel Foucault, War in the Filigree of Peace: Course Summary, 4 OXFORD
LITERARY REV. 15 (g8o), an early Collge de France course description that appeared in
English in ig8o; today the locus classicus for Foucault on struggle, taking matters far beyond the
slogan of "power/knowledge" that was once notorious, appears in FOUCAULT, supra note lo.
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the space of its own expertise" (p. 4).17 This is certainly true of
Kennedy's approach to expertise in global governance and interna-
tional law, but may not help figure out what struggles are continuing
within the community of experts on struggle - in the Hobbesian tra-
dition of which Foucault and Kennedy are recent luminaries. In lieu
of any detailed examination of how distinctive Kennedy's theory is
relative to his own competitors, it is nevertheless worth putting pres-
sure on its central implications. And it may also help to distinguish
Kennedy's approach from others with which it is liable to be confused.
Kennedy's theory of expertise is discursive in general and structur-
alist in particular. It focuses on expert language - the sole tool ex-
perts have to wield power. And it is especially interested in the archi-
tecture of the claims. Just as in built space, design elements that seem
to oppose each other can shore each other up. In fact, Kennedy's theo-
ry flows pretty naturally out of the marriage of the discursivist
epistemology characteristic of Hobbes, Foucault, and others with the
structuralist approach to legal discourse that - Kennedy acknowledg-
es - his mentor Professor Duncan Kennedy made famous as part of
the invention of "critical legal studies" (p. 172). It is notable that when
his theory becomes most detailed, what Kennedy continues to find
most exciting is the possibility that a theory could systematize "the it-
erative and interactive process of doing things with words" in which
speakers are involved (p. 144). Indeed, Kennedy goes so far as to
write: "[p]erhaps expertise is analogous to language" (p. 144). The
gambit or temptation of structuralists - for whom discourse has long
provided their most reliable example - is to see expert activity itself
as possessing the same logic as the discourse experts use. "[G]iven a
vocabulary," Kennedy remarks, "many things can be said on the foun-
dation of grammar" (p. 144). This is a classic structuralist thought,
implying that the best way to illuminate some form of activity - ex-
pertise in this case - is to unveil the rules shaping it. And the classic
example of a structure is a language. A World of Struggle appears to
reach its culmination when it is engaging in the structuralist work of
outlining discursive possibilities, providing inventories of assertion,
and demonstrating how binary oppositions embrace one another as ar-
gumentative options.
17 Specifically, Kennedy remarks:
My approach has been most directly influenced by scholarship in sociology and science
studies that stresses the context within which expertise arises and is practiced, from the
laboratory to the boardroom, and the components of expertise that operate in those
spaces, from "tacit knowledge," through shared ethics of perception, to modes of reason-
ing and argument. (p. 4)
He cites his colleague and frequent co-teacher Professor Sheila Jasanoff as a particularly fertile
source of inspiration, along with contemporary "actor-network" theory (p. 282).
20I6] 21I79C
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
It would be easy, though not very illuminating, to wonder if in his
discursive and structuralist approach Kennedy has courted biases of
his own. Just as Kennedy alleges biases for reification and systemiza-
tion in those who understate the powers of experts, one can worry that
he fails to mark the limits of his own discursive bent and allows his
structuralism to beckon him into the very kind of systematization he
has banned - as if discursive inventory alone suffices to make much
sense of the way power works in international affairs and law. Of
course the seemingly neutral workings of knowledge serve the
achievement of power, just as Kennedy reports; but many people will
want to respond that this is because expertise is so often transparently
subservient to forces like the drive to hierarchy and the appetite for
wealth - both forces that condition the processes and explain the out-
comes of argument more than vice versa.
When Kennedy gestures beyond discourse, it is primarily to psy-
chology or spirituality. The powerful into whose ears experts whisper
drop away, reversing the usual penchant to blame them rather than
their advisers - but it is legitimate to worry that in reversing the fo-
cus, A World of Struggle goes to the opposite extreme. It rewrites
Niccolb Machiavelli except that now so much attention falls on the
adviser that the ruler is nowhere to be found. (It is generally agreed to
be a bad thing to stage Hamlet without the prince, but it is even more
surprising to read The Prince without him around.) Those who need
to know that international lawyers who claim to be stewards of prog-
ress are in fact wielding power will find food for thought in Kennedy's
depiction. But the account will not be as compelling to those who are
already aware that powerful faith communities teem in the world and
wonder how this one achieved such preeminence - and how the faith
of this increasingly visible church seems to be a small factor in its own
success and in broader outcomes in view of much larger forces explain-
ing who wins and loses in international "order."
And even when it comes to experts themselves, it is not clear what
Kennedy thinks is ultimately at stake in their struggles for power, if it
is not the promotion of goals and the furtherance of ideologies that ex-
pertise has not itself constituted, at least not altogether. It is possible
that the foundation of "struggle" provides Kennedy's theory the endur-
ing background motivation of experts, and not just the source of their
ongoing engagements with one another. Much as another Hobbesian,
Charles Darwin, supposed in The Origin of Species that the bitter
"struggle for existence" is the context against which the play of natural
selection occurs, providing the motor of rivalry that creates evolution-
ary winners and losers, so in Kennedy's account competition for ad-
vantage explains not just the substance of expert maneuvering but its
rationale too. But if this is the case it raises a potentially severe diffi-
culty for Kennedy's theory, for the motivation for success in the war of
all against all that characterized nature for Hobbes and Darwin -
2 ISO0 [Vol. I2 9:2I164
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
namely, avoiding the very real threat of extinction - may not obtain
as precisely in Kennedy's theater of struggle. (This is especially so if
some actors not only perpetually lose, but also embrace this fact as a
badge of honor, a possibility that could not occur to Hobbes or
Darwin, for whom agents that would want to lose in the quest for sur-
vival were inconceivable.)
Sometimes, in other words, it appears that because Kennedy has
granted so much power to epistemic construction of the realms of their
expertise, experts are engaged in relatively free-standing competition,
like in a more literal game that people agree to play that has no end
outside of itself. In response, one might ask: are world affairs really a
game? The stakes certainly seem high to the actors, including the ex-
perts, involved. But even to the extent struggle is a motivation for
their gamesmanship, and not merely the internal feature that rivalry is
in all competitive games, what are experts struggling to win? Hobbes
and Darwin could posit that life is what accounts for the struggle, but
for all the sophistication of his theory of expertise, Kennedy's discur-
sive and structuralist bias has no answer when it comes to what objec-
tives actors achieve. Kennedy's answer is clearly "distribution," but
distribution of what? On this point Kennedy both gestures to the fate-
ful consequences of who wins, while not defining what the stakes are.
I should add that in failing to make his theory of expertise a broad-
er social theory, avoiding analysis of what links struggles of experts to
any scheme of underlying causal determinants, Kennedy saves himself
from some simple-minded attempts to make the connection.
A Marxist with a view of expertise as "ideology" would complain that
Kennedy's picture is one of water boiling, but omits the pot, and even
the fire. But if it is notoriously difficult to spell out such an alternative
materialist view, my point is that Kennedy has not even tried to do so,
in part out of the desire to show how far a constructivist and discur-
sive approach can illuminate. The question is whether omitting any
causal theory of the worldly rather than epistemic and of real rather
than ideal determinants of expertise - aiming at a fully internalist
theory of expertise, without reconstructing its setting in a world of
power and interest - is satisfactory. The force of this question is re-
doubled since, unlike Bourdieu, Kennedy does not focus on the "expert
capital" that people might gain from simply being good at being ex-
perts (promotions, professorships, and so forth). Rather, Kennedy
seems to have a completely constructivist notion of expertise in which
not only the game is an expert construction, but also the reason for
playing it.
This aphasia about or avoidance of any real determinants of expert
claims does provide Kennedy considerable analytical purchase on a
very different school of thought about international law that one might
otherwise confuse with his own theory. Like an older "realist" take on
international relations of which their approach is a recent version,
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some contemporary theorists of international law suggest that states
only follow it when doing so fits their interests in the course of ongoing
interstate struggle." Kennedy does not engage this comparably dis-
abused (and likewise Hobbesian) theory of international law. But
what he argues of Hans Morgenthau - that he reifies the interstate
system and masks the distributive work that epistemic de-
scription does (pp. 79-80) - certainly applies mutatis mutandis to
Morgenthau's contemporary successors in the theory of international
law. More interestingly, Kennedy's epistemic constructivism bears
powerfully on the notion of the objectivity of interests and preferences
that rational choice and other kindred theories of international affairs
notoriously leave out of account. Kennedy's theory indicates that it is
not just the interests of states that such approaches to international
law take for granted and therefore fail to explain, but the interests of
states too. As we have seen in spades, Kennedy certainly emphasizes
distribution of advantage that agents seek and gain through expertise
as the heart of his theory. Yet he plainly is not operating with a realist
or objectivist theory of interests. Put another way, where other ap-
proaches make preferences antecedent to struggle, for Kennedy they
are endogenous to it, constantly open to expert identification and
redescription.
Kennedy seems simply not to worry about one potentially troubling
effect of this powerful move, which is to ratify and intensify the dis-
cursive and constructivist bias of his own approach. We know that
everyone is involved in struggle for advantage, but since the definition
of advantage is itself an object of struggle, we no longer know what
the game is for.
V. EXPERTS AT WAR
In a final chapter, Kennedy takes up the contemporary law of war.
Throughout the book, he provides examples to illustrate his conten-
tions. Regularly a few lines or a paragraph, these examples may ac-
cumulate into full-scale meditations on economic development or hu-
man rights if pieced together. By contrast, Kennedy's lengthy foray
into the law of war in a single chapter of the book is his most sus-
tained vindication of what his theory achieves. It therefore also offers
the reader the most substantial material on which to evaluate how his
theory illuminates the complexity of a specific expert domain.
1 For a famous articulation of this approach, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER,
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). In contrast to Kennedy, for example, Professor
Jens Ohlin criticizes recent rational choice theorists on their own ground, by claiming that inter-
national law regularly abets cooperation and advances long-term interests. See JENS DAVID
OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015).
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Kennedy has an easy time contradicting "the image of law as the
voice and hand of the universal come to civilize swords into plow-
shares" (p. 273). Instead, expert pronouncements on the legality of
specific acts of warfare are part of the operation of state power and
not merely its limitation. He puts the point powerfully:
International law is equally - indeed, perhaps more routinely - the
space within which war is conceived and validated and through which
force is disciplined and rendered effective. . . . [S]overeigns do routinely
discipline and legitimate their military campaigns by pronouncing on the
legality of bombing here or killing there. When this happens successfully,
international law confirms the violent expression of sovereign power as
right. (p. 258)
For this reason, Kennedy has no trouble, as mentioned earlier, signing
on to the frequent American perception that law has today become a
weapon of and not just a limitation on military conflict - there is so-
called "lawfare" alongside traditional warfare - since it perfectly con-
firms his theory and is merely a specific instance of the fact that exper-
tise is war by other means.
In the face of this situation, Kennedy proposes that applying his
framework to the contemporary law of war means "suspend[ing] the
effort to determine who is right" in various familiar debates in order to
reconstruct the work of articulation. In this case, it is valuable to
capture the articulation of the permissibility and impermissibility of
killing:
Articulation becomes effective as force as people make legal arguments
about war and all sorts of people have gotten into the act: military officers,
human rights lawyers, Red Cross lawyers, demonstrators, ambassadors,
presidents and prime ministers, media commentators, and, of course, law
professors. . . . The sum of their statements is what international law has
become. (p. 269)
In applying his theory to the law of war, Kennedy outlines some of
the "projects" that "people with projects" have undertaken (p. 70).
Some want room for maneuver so that the state can kill more people,
whereas others who present themselves as partisans of humanity
against states want fewer dead. And then there is the group that an-
gles for professional victory for its own sake, acting orthogonally to the
others but most successfully, since both sides operate through lawfare
and thus make law ever more important. Kennedy's demonstration of
how expert articulation is constituted and changes what war is about,
even while transforming the identities of experts along the way, is pro-
found. For example, he observes, the rise of lawfare leads what would
once have been simple military necessity to be presented in terms of
high principles of justice, while the original defenders of justice may
be led to extremist interpretations that insist on following rules even
when it courts "broader destruction" (p. 272).
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All the same, what is potentially most revealing in this account is
that, even in Kennedy's rendition, it is pretty clear what the different
forces and even interests are. They are not much reconstructed by
their own practices of expertise; rather, expertise is a detour through
which they travel in order to reinvent their antecedent identities and
interests from their old terrain of struggle, even if it is newly legalized.
On one side is the military, on the other the humanitarians. Some
lawyers (and law professors) may have most to gain if legal expertise is
inserted where it did not obtain before, but they themselves tend to
divide between sympathies for the military and the human rights
communities. 19
But if this is so, then at least when it comes to the law of war, a
politics of antecedent interests - including the politics of left and
right - turns out to endure powerfully in the storm of articulation. If
discourse is constituting these interests, it is not the discourse of the
law of war. True, the scene may not be open to a vulgar Marxist re-
duction of military imperatives to those of capital, any more than
Bourdieu's account of professionals struggling for status helps explain
why legal experts think their struggles are about the fate of the world
rather than their own careers and perquisites, even if they benefit
when their arguments succeed. Yet the law of war seems to indicate
what everyone knows: the game of expertise is surely about more than
itself. Too much is at stake in international affairs, or international
law in particular, for a fully discursive or constructivist account to ex-
plain everything. Of course, this does not mean anyone has succeeded
in reclaiming a sophisticated approach to the intersection of ideals and
interests in social theory today.20
In other words, Kennedy's story of lawfare has the vices of the con-
siderable virtues of his general approach. He is clear that "[t]here has
been a vast dispersion of sites and institutions and procedures through
which legal distinctions about war are made," but he does not say why
(p. 259). And we are largely in the dark concerning what forces are
driving expert involvement in war, since Kennedy's emphasis is in-
stead on the threshold point that expertise itself redefines the game
once played with less reliance on its tools. True, contemporary armed
conflict is no longer like warfare of old, with its once transparent if
19 The recent appearance of and widespread affiliation with rival blogs for national security
law professors on the American scene - illustratively called "Just Security" and "Lawfare" re-
spectively - indicates that everyone knows what the teams are, even as the game changes.
See JUST SECURITY, https://www.justsecurity.org [http://perma.cc/M6QC-5NUY]; LAWFARE,
http://www.lawfareblog.com [http://perma.cc/WgUZ-WB7G].
20 For a depiction of our current moment as a post-discursive and post-idealist one, without
any powerful mode of accounting for the interface of ideologies and practices, see Samuel Moyn,
Imaginary Intellectual History, in RETHINKING MODERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HIS-
TORY I12 (Darrin M. McMahon & Samuel Moyn eds., 2014).
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simple rules legitimating the inception of violence, controlling the
fighting, and distributing the spoils. As a result, the law governing the
use of force has fallen into disarray, and Kennedy agrees that nobody
knows in the "fog of victory"21 when war is actually over (p. 263). But
if Kennedy's theory is unable to explain why the expert domain of in-
ternational law spiked in relevance in the first place, it may not ac-
count for how enduring the goals of actors within it are, and thus why
they are engaging in their expert practice.
VI. THE NIGHT OF NON-KNOWLEDGE?
No description is neutral, Kennedy teaches; each is instead a pow-
erful move in struggle with one's enemy. But then presumably the
same has to be true of his description of global governance. "How
might this approach, familiar to people engaged in struggle, be more
systematically pursued in academic inquiry?" he asks at one point
about his emphasis on struggle-driven and expert-abetted "gover-
nance" (p. 66). It is an interesting turn of phrase because his approach
is supposed to put "systems" in their place as internal outcomes of
struggle rather than as external vantage points on it. Similarly,
Kennedy proposes a "cartography" of struggle, and offers a valuable
section contrasting his map from standard views (pp. 75-86). But how
is his own theory of the role of expertise in global governance immune
from his theory itself? If "systematizing" is typically only a move in
"struggle" that conceals this fact, then how can he promise to systema-
tize it? If a map is a product of expertise, how can Kennedy's provide
a vantage point on the territory?
Like many before him, Kennedy is not overly concerned with the
possibility that his argument may fail the test of self-reference. But it
does raise the question of what sort of knowledge this expert book
provides, and what difference in the world Kennedy would like to see.
To the extent Kennedy's extremely austere portrait of struggle - peo-
ple pursuing projects - is supposed to win analytical neutrality pre-
cisely in virtue of its austerity, its neutrality succeeds. But no one
could read the entire book and doubt that Kennedy is committed to
something. He is not describing global governance for the sake of de-
scription alone. He has his own struggles.
Something of the cool detachment of the expert he describes marks
Kennedy's own rhetoric and self-presentation. But in a familiar criti-
cal move he stresses that the purpose of A World of Struggle is to make
expert rule visible so as to end it or at least to transform it profoundly.
Just as Foucault routinely claimed that a few marginal and monitory
21 Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 391 (2013).
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poets had preserved external insight on the modern tyranny of experts,
Kennedy holds out a promise of justice in the world beyond the work-
ings of expertise. "The fact that their only formulation now is a lyrical
one," Foucault insisted of his favorite pariahs who protested the diag-
noses of modern experts, "is not proof that they are dying away, nor
that they are merely the prolongation of an existence that knowledge
has long surpassed, but demonstrates quite simply that when kept in
the shadows they still flourish." 2 2  Similarly, Kennedy states on his
penultimate page that his goal is to raise "critical suspicion" about the
reign of expertise, inviting the reader to join in his skepticism (p. 278).
"[Y]ou are not alone," he adds (p. 278). "And you don't need to start
from scratch. There is a long tradition of intellectual work lying
alongside the mainstream routines of your professional or academic
discipline on which you can rely" (pp. 278-79). In conclusion, it is
worth disengaging and putting some pressure on this stance, in part
because it is so attractive. 2 3
Consider two of its possible limitations. The first is that it is
vague. In its remorseless censure of human rights and other experts
who certainly believe they are working for good causes, even while ex-
empting its own calls for justice from the pathologies of expertise, the
critical stance refers somewhat amorphously to the possibility of a bet-
ter world beyond the expert reproduction of things as they are. "Mod-
ern expertise knows and it forgets - or refuses to know - its powers
and its limits. When they forget - and we forget - it becomes all the
more difficult to understand how this world, with all its injustice and
suffering, has been made and reproduced," Kennedy writes in one pas-
sage (p. 5). "And more difficult to identify levers of change or experi-
ence the place we stand as a fulcrum of possibility. The result of con-
tinuous struggle is an eerie stability it is hard to imagine challenging or
changing" (p. 5). After many passages like this in A World of Struggle,
it begins to seem that the most that one can say about true justice
is that expertise postpones it and conceals its participation in the
postponement.
As for what that justice would look like, Kennedy is coy It is clear
it would have to involve enormous changes, and understandably so.
Mere reformism - the kind for which he sees his students signing up
22 MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF MADNESS 169-70 (Jean Khalfa ed., Jonathan Murphy
& Jean Khalfa trans., Routledge 2006) (ig6i). Similarly, Foucault claims in The Order of Things
that "right up to our own day - from [Friedrich] Hdlderlin to [St6phane] Mallarm6 and on to
Antonin Artaud - literature" escaped otherwise dominating structures so as to "form[] a sort of
'counter-discourse."' MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF
THE HUMAN SCIENCES 43-44 (Random House 1970) (1966).
23 I have certainly indulged the familiar critical move myself. See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, THE
LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
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with excitement - may make sense, whether redoing the United Na-
tions Security Council membership, maxing out the International
Criminal Court's budget, or meeting the current Millennium Devel-
opment Goals and adding the much touted and debated Sustainable
Development Goals to them (pp. 15-17). Ultimately, however, these
achievements "would kick things down the road, manage expectations,
and, by rendering the problems sustainable, reaffirm the current dis-
tribution of powers" (p. 17). By contrast, Kennedy does not outline
what sort of solution would escape this withering verdict. He says he
remains puzzled by the fact that experts in training set out to change
the world fundamentally and end up choosing lives that leave its basic
divisions unaltered. He shies away from counter-expertise, aside from
vague calls for justice.
Of course, there is a field of experts - called philosophers - to
whom people have long looked for a theory of justice. Interestingly,
this field is entirely absent from Kennedy's approach to governance.
Kennedy might suspect, rather plausibly, that card-carrying philoso-
phers since Plato have bought into their own myth of the empyrean
too much to see that they are operating on their own terrain of strug-
gle, and that they engage in their own strategies that help stabilize the
unjust world as it is.24 Or he might think that philosophy as it stands
remains a field of expertise able to make critical moves only at the cost
of distance from real-world decisionmaking. Either way, it is at some
point incumbent on critics who refer somewhat longingly to justice as
what contemporary intellectual and political life mostly excludes to
engage in normative theory of their own.
The second limitation is a kind of mysticism that rushes into the
void of normative theory, when justice is viewed as something that ex-
perts are so far failing to provide. Kennedy is convincing in his claim
that expertise is the "missing piece" in accounting for the "strange resil-
ience" of the world as it stands (pp. 14, 16). At times he calls for a re-
formed expertise more knowing about its current reproduction of hier-
archy, but in other passages he hints at a form of rule beyond
knowledge. These absorbing passages deserve a look in conclusion,
because in them it seems that Kennedy offers what he believes his
deepest wisdom is - and the trouble is that this wisdom is as enigmat-
ic as it is tantalizing.
Kennedy makes it quite apparent that a kind of ambivalent half-
belief in expertise among experts themselves is what paradoxically
makes the rule of professional knowledge immune from challenge. It
24 And I would concur. See Samuel Moyn, Human Rights in Heaven, in HUMAN RIGHTS:




is "the subtle secret of its success," he says at one point (p. 'o).
"[I]ndeterminate language and uncertain knowledge distribute wealth
and power," he adds (p. 2). Kennedy dwells repeatedly on the sort of
disenchanted faith this uncertainty calls on experts to cultivate, but in
perhaps the most remarkable passage in A World of Struggle, he ex-
plains that buried within the experience of expert rule itself lies an al-
ternative to it. There is a moment, Kennedy reports, of "yielding"
when two rival experts sure of their answers contend and one gives up
to allow the other's wisdom to prevail (p. 165). "The personal experi-
ence of legal pluralism that comes with 'yielding' unmoors profession-
als from the confident sense that their expertise grounds their action.
Suddenly, there is a choice: a moment of vertigo and professional free-
dom" (p. 255). And in that dizzying instant, actual possibility beckons
beyond sham compromises of injustice and the stabilization of exper-
tise. Kennedy calls this "a moment of unknowing" in which it is sud-
denly possible to "glimpse an alternative to rule by experts" (p. 166).
In that moment, Kennedy affirms, "the world's irrationality makes
plain the constructed nature of theories about how it all fits together
and the tendentiousness of practices in their name. Professional prac-
tice suddenly has no progressive telos, and international law opens as a
terrain for politics, rather than a recipe or escape from political choice"
(p. 255). Such a credo is easily recognizable, as Kennedy himself ob-
serves, as an existentialist ethics in which the central task is to erase
the distortion that there are right choices and a true life, the better to
embrace the "responsibility" of contingency and freedom.
But Kennedy leaves existentialist freedom as enigmatic as ever.
And it is quite another matter whether such liberation of experts who
acknowledge their ignorance would provide much of a step toward
justice - for reformist expertise promises a modicum of improvement,
not merely false certainty, and perhaps it is for this reason that its ap-
peal regularly wins out.2 5 It seems as if we will need something better
than the mysticism of "unknowing" to beat it. Perhaps my two reser-
vations in this Review concerning Kennedy's magisterial achievement
are related: a theory of how experts rule that is less focused on their
language and more on forces outside expertise that help account for its
ends, forms and outcomes might also induce less longing for "unknow-
ing." It might even promote an expertise oriented more explicitly to-
ward alternatives in the world and thus preoccupied with the design of
25 This is especially so since, in the tradition of unknowing with which Kennedy self-
consciously affiliates, "[t]he instant of decision is a madness" - a nearly irrationalist stance in
which few can have much practical confidence, and understandably so. Jacques Derrida, Force of
Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," II CARDOZO L. REV. glg, 967 (Mary Quaintance
trans., 19go). Derrida claimed to be paraphrasing Soren Kierkegaard. Id. Derrida explained,
anticipating Kennedy, that such decisions involve "acting in the night of non-knowledge." Id.
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truly different institutions. In any case, the release of experts from
their own resigned faith is obviously not equivalent to structural jus-
tice across the globe.
In A World of Struggle, Kennedy has written a memorable classic.
It gathers together his longstanding inquiries in one place and takes
them far beyond the domain of international law in which he began
his career, and even beyond the precincts of legal theory His book, the
most sophisticated interpretation of "global governance" now available,
is a tremendous contribution to the present generation, and future
ones, about how best to think about our common plight - especially
for those who would like a different world. Clearly, achieving that
world will not just be a matter of bestowing the gift of beneficent
knowledge on the operations of ignorant power; it is far too late for
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